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Standards are ubiquitous in today’s technology-driven marketplace. Some standards mandate 
minimum requirements for product safety, others seek to reduce environmental impact, while 
others specify minimum levels of information that must be provided to consumers. 
“Interoperability standards,” which dominate the information and communications technology 
(ICT) sector, specify the manner in which products and services offered by different vendors 
interface with one another. Many of these standards, including Wi-Fi, USB, Bluetooth, DVD, PDF 
and HTML, have become household terms, and thousands of others ensure that a vast array of 
products and services interact seamlessly in a manner that is largely invisible to the consumer.  
 
The explosion of bioinformatics and medical informatics technologies (“informatics”) over the 
past two decades has led to a surge of interest in the development of interoperability and 
compatibility standards for informatics applications. These standards range from genome 
annotation and controlled vocabularies (ontologies) to data formats and search engine integration.  
A variety of standards development organizations (SDOs) are involved in informatics 
standardization activities. These include large, established bodies such as the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), and 
the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) to broad-
based informatics industry associations such as the Asia-Pacific Bioinformatics Network, the 
European Bioinformatics Institute (EBI), and the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health 
(GA4GH), to narrowly-focused efforts such as the Adaptive Immune Receptor Repertoire (AIRR) 
Community, Proteomics Standards Initiative (PSI) and the Functional Genomics Investigation 
Ontology (FuGO) project. 1  Well-known SDOs with a clinical informatics focus include the 
Clinical Data Interchange Standards Consortium (CDISC), Digital Imaging and Communications 
in Medicine (DICOM), Health Level 7 International (HL7), and SNOMED International. 
 
Over the past three decades, standardization in the ICT sector has experienced both enormous 
success as well as major disputes. Litigation has spread around the world, with lawsuits brought 
by participants in the standards-development process, and by government regulators and affected 
third parties. SDOs in the ICT sector have responded to these claims by promulgating rules and 
policies of increasing sophistication, both to specify procedures designed to avoid abusive activity 
and to accommodate the requirements of their principal participants. 
 
With a few exceptions, the biomedical industry, and the informatics field in particular, have not 
been affected by the standards litigation that has plagued the ICT industry. But with the increasing 
adoption of standards by informatics researchers and vendors, the issues faced by ICT standards 
groups will become increasingly relevant.  This chapter summarizes general legal issues associated 
with standards development, then surveys standardization efforts in the informatics space and 
reviews the policies and procedures adopted by SDOs operating in the informatics area. It 
	
1 For a general overview of the international standardization landscape, see Brad Biddle, No Standard for Standards: 
Understanding the ICT Standards-Development Ecosystem, in Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization 
Law: Competition, Antitrust, and Patents 17 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). 
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concludes with recommendations regarding prudent policy adoption by SDOs developing 
standards for informatics applications. 
 
 
I. STANDARDS AND STANDARD SETTING: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
A. Types of Standards 
 
Standards serve a variety of purposes and functions. Some standards specify requirements intended 
to protect public health and safety, to preserve the environment, and to prevent fraud and other 
abuses.  These include standards relating to food and drugs, air and water quality, hazardous 
materials, construction, transportation, handling of personal data, and the like.  Other standards 
signify a specified level of quality, such as the 4C (cut, color, clarity and carat) ratings for 
diamonds. Most relevant to informatics, however, are interoperability or compatibility standards, 
which specify design features that enable data, equipment, and services produced by different 
parties to operate together. Electrical outlets, for example, share a common design in the United 
States that enables any appliance to be plugged into an outlet anywhere in the country (though, as 
any frequent traveler knows, these standards vary dramatically from country to country). More 
complex, but equally illustrative, are the numerous networking (USB, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth), Internet 
(TCP/IP, HTML, http), telecommunications (GSM, LTE) and digital media (CD, DVD, BluRay) 
standards that enable devices manufactured by different vendors to interact with one another in a 
manner that is largely invisible to the consumer. 
 
At the highest level of generality, standards may be categorized as either mandatory, meaning that 
compliance is required by an external body, such as a governmental agency or a professional 
accreditation organization, or voluntary, meaning that compliance is not required, though it may 
be prudent or even necessary from a commercial standpoint. Mandatory standards are often 
adopted by governments to protect the health and welfare of their citizens. Most interoperability 
standards, however, are voluntary. 
 
B. Standards Development Organizations  
 
Standards may be developed in many different environments. Individual companies or institutions 
may release a technology or format to the industry in the hope that it will become broadly adopted. 
Such “de facto” standards include Adobe Systems’ Portable Document Format (PDF) and 
Microsoft’s “.doc” document format. Other standards may be developed by a group of companies 
and institutions working collaboratively within a standards-development organization (SDO). 
SDOs vary greatly in size and composition. Some SDOs consist of just a few participants that 
collaborate on a focused set of technical specifications, sometimes for a single product. These are 
sometimes referred to as consortia or “special interest groups” (SIGs). Standards for many 
consumer electronics devices and digital media such as the DVD disc and player were developed 
by SIGs. Other SDOs are very large and encompass many different standardization activities at 
any given time. ASTM International, for example, is one of the largest SDOs and regularly 
develops standards in areas as diverse as electrical wiring, playground equipment, composite 
materials, unmanned aircraft, and nanotechnology.2  
	
2 See ASTM Int’l, www.astm.org. 
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The work of individual SDOs is sometimes coordinated at the national and international levels. In 
the United States, SDOs can be accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
if they meet certain criteria of openness, due process, and transparency (“Essential 
Requirements”). The standards developed by ANSI-approved SDOs can be designated as 
American National Standards (ANS), a status that both validates and promotes adoption.  More 
than 200 different SDOs are currently accredited by ANSI.   
 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a Geneva-based non-governmental 
organization whose members include 164 national standards institutes from across the globe.  ISO 
coordinates standards-development activities among its members and develops its own consensus 
standards through numerous committees.  In addition, ISO often collaborates with other standards 
bodies. It observes a common intellectual property policy with the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the International Electrotechnical Committee (IEC), and 
develops healthcare informatics standards with CEN.3	
 
Many governmental agencies also adopt standards, either as part of their regulatory function or for 
their own use. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) has promulgated guidelines 
requiring that U.S. federal agencies adopt suitable “voluntary consensus standards” in their 




II. COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST ISSUES IN STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
 
One of the principal purposes of antitrust law is to prevent competitors from colluding in ways that 
are harmful to competition and the market.  Such collusive behavior in the U.S. is prohibited under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which bans agreements in restraint of trade.5 Conversely, Section 2 
of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization and attempted monopolization. In recent years, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has also exercised its authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act 
to prosecute unfair methods of competition that arise in the standards-setting context.6 Because 
consensus-based technical standards are generally developed through collaborative processes that 
involve multiple competitors, a basic understanding of antitrust law principles is critical to 
effective operation of any SDO.  This section summarizes some of the major antitrust and 
competition issues that can arise in the standards-setting context. 
 
	
3 CEN has an agreement with ISO to jointly plan and simultaneously approve international and European standards. 
International standards have primary, but CEN may also need to develop standards meeting European priorities. The 
preferred route is for standards work to begin at a European level and then be raised to the international level.  ISO & 
CEN “Agreement On Technical Co-Operation Between ISO and CEN (Vienna Agreement) (1991) 
https://www.cencenelec.eu/intcoop/StandardizationOrg/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 15, 2020). 
4 Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular A-119: Federal Participation in the Development and Use of 
Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, Jan. 22, 2016.  
5 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
6 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665429
CONTRERAS AND THOROGOOD  TECHNICAL STANDARDS 
5 
 
A. Improper Exclusion  
 
SDOs must exercise caution if they wish to limit their membership or to expel a member after it 
has joined.7 The exclusion of parties from the standard-setting process can be viewed as an attempt 
by the SDO members to gain an unfair advantage over the excluded parties. Accordingly, many 
SDOs do not restrict their membership and claim to be open to all interested participants.8  Being 
“open,” however, does not mean that an SDO must admit all participants on equal terms. It is not 
uncommon, for example, for SDOs to vary their membership fees based on a participant’s size, 
revenue, or industry sector (e.g., producer, customer, government, academic, etc.).9 Courts have 
also held that trade associations may establish reasonable criteria for membership, even if such 
criteria necessarily exclude some potential participants;10 many important industry standards, such 
as the CD and DVD digital storage formats were developed by small, closed groups of industry 
participants.  Although some limitations may be permitted, SDOs can avoid allegations of 
improper exclusion by opening their membership as broadly as possible.  Similar issues regarding 
exclusion arise when a group wishes to expel a member. In short, expulsion of a member is 
generally permissible when the member has violated the organization’s rules or otherwise acted in 
an unlawful or unethical manner, but raises antitrust concerns when effected for competitive 
purposes.11 
 
Claims of anticompetitive exclusion can arise in connection with technologies as well as 
participants.  Thus, even if a company is not excluded from participation in an SDO, it is possible 
for other SDO participants to collude to exclude that company’s technology from a standard under 
consideration.  Such claims were raised, for example, in Addamax Corp. v. Open Software 
Foundation Inc.12 Addamax was a developer of security software for the UNIX operating system. 
Open Software Foundation (OSF), a consortium of computer and software vendors, developed a 
version of UNIX that included a security package developed by one of Addamax’s competitors. 
Addamax alleged, among other things, that OSF’s exclusion of its security software from OSF 
UNIX amounted to unfair competition and a boycott of Addamax’s products by the members of 
OSF. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected these claims, holding that Addamax 
failed to show that the eventual decline in sales of its security products was attributable to 
concerted action by OSF and its members. 13  Other unsuccessful cases involving claims of 
exclusion have been brought against SDOs more recently.14 
	
7 See generally, Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Handbook on the Antitrust Aspects of Standards 
Setting 51-52 (2d ed. 2011) (hereinafter “ABA Antitrust Handbook”). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Nat’l Ass’n of Review Appraisers & Mortg. Underwriters v. Appraisal Found., 64 F.3d 1130, 1133 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(upholding Appraisal Foundation’s membership criteria where there was no evidence of any harm to the overall market 
for appraisal organizations). 
11 See, e.g., Pretz v. Holstein Friesian Ass’n of Am., 698 F. Supp. 1531, 1542 (D. Kan. 1988) (holding that cattle 
registry association did not commit antitrust violation by expelling a member alleged to be manipulating tests for 
grading cattle). 
12 152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 1998). 
13 Id. at 53. 
14 See Golden Bridge Tech. v. Nokia Inc., No. 6:06-CV-163, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67071, at *25-26 (E.D.Tex. Sept. 
10, 2007) (plaintiff unsuccessfully claimed that defendants intentionally excluded its technology from standard 
relating to wireless telephony); True Position, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 2011-CV-04574-RK, 2012 WL 33075 
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B. Improper Exchange of Information   
 
If competitors exchange sensitive commercial information during standard-setting meetings, or if 
they otherwise use the standard-setting process as a vehicle for engaging in illegal collusion, the 
SDO can be challenged for facilitating this unlawful behavior.  The clearest example of behavior 
exposing SDOs to potential antitrust risk is the sharing of information relating to product pricing 
or salaries.15  But less blatant instances of information sharing may also lead to allegations of 
anticompetitive behavior. For example, a standard could facilitate collusion by making it easier 
for competitors to monitor and enforce illegal price fixing agreements.16   
 
C. Compliance Certification 
 
In some cases, the members of an SDO may improperly influence the SDO’s decisions regarding 
whether a competitor’s products comply with a standard.  The Supreme Court addressed this type 
of behavior in American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp.17 In that case, a 
subcommittee chair of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), a professional 
association with over 90,000 members, misrepresented that Hydrolevel’s boiler control valves did 
not conform to a key provision of ASME’s Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, and were therefore 
unsafe.  The chair allegedly made these misrepresentations because his employer competed with 
Hydrolevel. When ASME staff propagated this inaccurate portrayal, Hydrolevel alleged that it 
suffered significant harm in the market. The Supreme Court held that ASME could be liable for 
these misrepresentations, as the weight of its reputation greatly enhanced the anticompetitive effect 
of its member’s misrepresentation.18 
 
But not all allegations that an SDO improperly failed to certify a product’s compliance with its 
standards are successful.  In Consolidated Metal Products v. American Petroleum Institute,19 the 
plaintiff alleged that the American Petroleum Institute (API) committed an antitrust violation by 
intentionally delaying certification of its products.  The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim, holding 




(E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2012) (alleging that concerted activity by defendants, including two SDOs, resulted in exclusion of 
plaintiff’s technology from wireless telecommunications standard). 
15 See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (holding that exchange of price quotes 
for sales of corrugated containers was a price fixing agreement that violated the Sherman Act since the product was 
fungible and demand was inelastic); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 214-15 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding that 
employees have a claim against employers to examine employers' habit of sharing information regarding non-
managerial, non-union workers to determine if it is was a collusion to keep wages down in violation of the Sherman 
Act). 
16 See Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and Trade and Professional Association Standards and Certification, 19 
Dayton L. Rev. 471, 486 (1994). 
17 456 U.S. 556 (1982). 
18 Id. at 577. 
19 Consol. Metal Prod., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988). 
20 Id. at 293; see generally ABA Antitrust Handbook, supra note 7, at 55-59. 
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D. Abuse of Process   
 
Perhaps the most frequent antitrust charge against SDOs is the claim that one or more participants 
abused the process by which standards are set within the SDO, either to secure approval of a 
standard that they backed or to exclude the technology of their competitors from a standard.  The 
Supreme Court addressed this type of abuse in Allied Tube & Conduit v. Indian Head.21  In that 
case, the plaintiff, a manufacturer of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) products, requested that the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) approve an amendment to the National Electrical 
Code that would have allowed the use of PVC in electrical wiring conduits. The defendant, a 
manufacturer of steel conduit, recruited 230 people to join NFPA for the sole purpose of voting 
against the amendment, which was ultimately defeated by a vote of 394 to 390.  The jury found 
that the steel conduit manufacturers defeated the PVC standard solely for anticompetitive 
purposes, subverting the standards-development process and violating the antitrust laws. The 
Supreme Court agreed, stating that a participant in private standards-setting activities should not 
bias the process in a manner designed to restrain competition.22 
 
E. Policies and Precautions   
 
In order to avoid the types of antitrust claims discussed above, and to deter unlawful conduct by 
their participants, SDOs have increasingly adopted rules and policies that expressly prohibit 
anticompetitive behavior within the SDO context. Such policies typically seek to accomplish the 
following general objectives:  
 
a. to ensure that the standards-development process is open, fair and 
transparent; 
b. to ensure that membership in the SDO is open to all interested parties on a 
non-discriminatory basis; 
c. to prohibit the sharing of competitive information within the context of 
SDO activities; and 
d. to provide that compliance with standards is voluntary, and that 
participation in the SDO is not conditioned on use of the SDO’s output. 
 
While policies implementing these objectives cannot themselves prevent collusion or improper 
behavior, they can serve to raise awareness of antitrust issues within an SDO. More importantly, 
such policies can demonstrate (whether to potential plaintiffs or finders of fact) that the SDO has 
actively sought to curtail activity that could be construed as anticompetitive. 
 
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Standards often implicate and are affected by intellectual property. Indeed, standards themselves 
may specify patentable inventions, and the written embodiments of standards are generally 
protectable by copyright. Furthermore, the more complicated the technology that a standard 
	
21 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988). 
22 For a more detailed discussion of the Allied Tube case and other cases relating to due process within SDOs, see 
Jorge L. Contreras, Understanding ‘Balance’ Requirements for Standards Development Organizations, CPI Antitrust 
Chronicle, Sept. 2019. 
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specifies, the more likely the standard is to implicate patents owned by members of the SDO or by 
third parties. SDOs and implementers of technical standards are therefore likely to encounter 
numerous intellectual property issues outlined in this section. 
 
A. Copyright in Standards   
 
Technical standards typically take the form of written descriptions of how products or services 
should be designed, built, or operated. Like other written documents, standards are typically 
protected by copyright, meaning that they cannot be reproduced, displayed, or modified without 
permission of the copyright owner (often the SDO).23  Many SDOs earn significant revenue from 
the sale of standards (some of which extend to hundreds of pages) and therefore warn against 
illegal copying and distribution, though a number of major SDOs such as IETF and W3C allow 
their standards to be downloaded and copied without charge. 
 
The tension between copyright protection and the social utility of standards becomes particularly 
acute when a proprietary standard is adopted and referenced by a governmental agency 
(incorporated by reference), thereby becoming “the law.”24  Under longstanding principles of 
democratic governance, citizens are entitled to know the law.  Yet if a copyrighted standard, such 
as a building or electrical code, is incorporated by reference into law, the copyright holder can 
theoretically control access to that standard.  Some commentators have argued that standards, as 
purely utilitarian documents, should not be entitled to copyright protection at all.25 Others have 
argued that reproduction of such copyrighted documents should be permitted as “fair use” under 
copyright law.26 These issues are currently being litigated in Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. 
Public.Resource.org.27 
 
B. Patenting and Standards 
 
(1) Patents Covering Standardized Technology 
 
As noted above, standards are written descriptions of particular attributes of specified products and 
processes. Assuming that statutory requirements of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness are met, 
patents may be obtained on products and processes that conform with particular standards. Such 
patents would ordinarily not be obtained by the SDO in which the standard was developed, as 
SDOs seldom develop complete products and almost never seek to patent their work. Rather, if 
such a patent were obtained, it would be obtained by a participant in the SDO or an outsider, and 
sometimes both. Thus, two general patent-related issues arise in the context of technology 
standardization: “patent stacking” and “patent hold-up.” 
 
	
23 See Pamela Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto, Questioning Copyrights in Standards in The Cambridge Handbook 
of Technical Standardization Law: Further Intersections of Public and Private Law 91 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2019). 
24 See Daniel J. Sheffner, Integrating Technical Standards into Federal Regulations: Incorporation by Reference in 
The Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Further Intersections of Public and Private Law 108 
(Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2019). 
25 See Samuelson and Hashimoto, supra note 23. 
26 See Sheffner, supra note 24, at 119. 
27 Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.org, 896 F.3d 437 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (remanded to district 
court). 
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(2) Patent Stacking and Patent Pools 
 
Patent or royalty “stacking,” also referred to as a patent “thicket” or anti-commons, occurs when 
multiple entities each hold patents claiming aspects of a single standardized technology.28  In order 
for a producer to implement the standardized technology in a product, it must obtain licenses from 
multiple parties, each acting independently and each seeking to maximize its gains. The risk of 
stacking is that the sum of individual royalty demands may be excessive in relation to the overall 
value of the product, making the standardized product uncompetitive in comparison to products 
that do not conform with the standard.29 
 
One method of addressing patent stacking is through the creation of a patent pool. In a patent pool, 
multiple patent owners contribute or license patents that are essential to the implementation of the 
standard to a common agent (sometimes one of the patent holders and sometimes a newly-formed 
entity). Licensees are charged a single royalty to practice the entire group of patents, and net 
revenues are allocated among the pool participants in accordance with a pre-determined formula. 
Such pools have been used effectively in consumer electronics standards such as the MPEG audio 
compression format, 30  the DVD video compression format, 31  and third generation wireless 
communications standards.32  In each of these instances the U.S. Department of Justice approved 
the proposed patent pool, so long as it possessed certain features that would reduce potentially 
anticompetitive effects. 33  For example, pools must contain only patents “essential” to the 
implementation of the standard (as the inclusion of patents on substitute technologies could lessen 
competition among technical alternatives). Furthermore, licensees must have the freedom to obtain 
licenses to the patents independently from the pool, and licensing of the pooled patents must be 
conducted on a non-discriminatory basis. To the extent that the patent pool owners require 
licensees to “grant back” licenses to them, such grantback licenses must only cover patents that 
are, themselves, essential to implementation of the standard. 
 
It is important to note that the usefulness of a patent pool may be limited if fewer than all holders 
of essential patents participate. This situation arose in connection with the Federal Communication 
Commission’s (FCC) mandatory ATSC digital television standard.34  Though several holders of 
patents essential to the ATSC standard formed a patent pool, one patent holder, Japan’s Funai 
Electric Company, did not join. Instead, Funai sought to charge royalties for a single patent at a 
rate allegedly equal to the rate charged by the entire ATSC pool. Vizio, Inc., a U.S. television 
manufacturer, refused to pay this royalty, causing Vizio to seek relief from the FCC.  Though the 
matter was ultimately rendered moot when the Federal Circuit held that Vizio did not infringe the 
	
28 The economic and legal literature exploring this phenomenon, both within and outside the context of technical 
standards, is extensive and varied.  See Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and 
Intellectual Property: A Survey of the Literature (With an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches), in REsearch 
Handbook On The Economics Of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. II – Analytical Methods 185 (Peter S. Menell & 
David Schwartz eds., 2019). 
29  U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: 
Promoting Innovation and Competition 76-84 (2007) (hereinafter “2007 DOJ/FTC Report”). 
30 Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney (June 26, 1997). 
31 Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney (Dec. 16, 1998); 
Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Carey R. Ramos (June 10, 1999). 
32 Letter from Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Ky P. Ewing (Nov. 12, 2002). 
33 2007 DOJ/FTC Report, supra note 29, at 68-71. 
34 Vizio, Inc. v. Funai Elec. Co. Ltd., 24 F.C.C.R. 2880 (2009). 
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asserted patent,35 the dispute highlights the limited benefits of patent pooling arrangements that do 
not include all holders of standards-essential patents. 
 
(3) Patent Ambush 
 
The second major patent issue that can arise in the standards context is patent ambush. Patent 
ambush occurs when a patent holder seeks to assert a previously unidentified patent against 
implementers of a standard after the standard has been adopted (either by an SDO or a 
governmental agency). 36  If patent ambush occurs after the industry has devoted significant 
resources to production, marketing, and training with respect to standardized products (in 
economic terms, after the standard has become “locked-in”), unexpected royalty demands from 
patent holders can have an extremely disruptive effect on the market. This phenomenon is 
commonly referred to as “hold-up” and results in an increase in the cost of standardized products, 
sometimes to levels that are inefficient and uncompetitive with alternative technologies.37 
 
Patent ambush has been alleged in several cases within the ITC industry.  The first of these cases 
to gain significant attention involved Dell Computer, which allegedly failed to disclose patents 
covering the voluntary VL-bus standard that it helped to develop at the Video Electronics 
Standards Association (VESA).38 Following approval of the standard, Dell sought to enforce its 
patents against other computer manufacturers. Responding to complaints by these potential 
infringers, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sought to enjoin Dell’s enforcement activity on 
the ground that Dell’s violation of the VESA disclosure rule effectively rendered its patents 
unenforceable.  The FTC action resulted in the entry of a 1996 consent order that permanently 
prohibited Dell from enforcing its VL-bus patents against any third party.   
 
Perhaps the best-known disclosure failure within an SDO involved Rambus, Inc., a developer of 
semiconductor memory technology. Volumes have been written about the decade-long legal 
battles in which Rambus sought to assert its patents against implementers of dynamic random 
access memory (DRAM) technology standardized by the Joint Electron Device Engineering 
Council (JEDEC), a voluntary SDO in which Rambus participated in the early 1990s.39  Despite 
	
35 Vizio, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 605 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
36 See U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with 
Competition (2011) (hereinafter “FTC 2011 Report”); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of 
Standards (and One Not to), 48 B.C. L. Rev., 149 (2007); Sean M. Royall, et al., Deterring “Patent Ambush” in 
Standard Setting: Lessons Learned from Rambus and Qualcomm, Antitrust, Summer 2009, at 34. 
37 See FTC 2011 Report at 5 (“[a]t the time a manufacturer faces an infringement allegation, switching to an alternative 
technology may be very expensive if it has sunk costs in production using the patented technology. ... If so, the patentee 
can use the threat of an injunction to obtain royalties covering not only the market value of the patented invention, but 
also a portion of the costs that the infringer would incur if it were enjoined and had to switch. This higher royalty 
based on switching costs is called the “hold-up” value of the patent. Patent hold-up can over-compensate patentees, 
raise prices to consumers who lose the benefits of competition among technologies, and deter innovation by 
manufacturers facing the risk of hold-up”). 
38 In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). 
39 See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Technical Standardization, Section of Science & Tech. Law, Standards 
Development Patent Policy Manual vii-viii (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2007) (hereinafter “ABA Patent Policy Manual”); 
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 28, at 1929-30; Joel M. Wallace, Rambus v. F.T.C. in the Context of Standard-Setting 
Organizations, Antitrust, and the Patent Hold-Up Problem, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 661 (2009); Robert A. Skitol and 
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conduct that was condemned by both the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the FTC, 
Rambus was largely exonerated on the basis that the poorly-worded JEDEC patent policy was 
simply too imprecise an instrument to support liability.  The court criticized the JEDEC policy as 
suffering from “a staggering lack of defining details” that left SDO participants with “vaguely 
defined expectations as to what they believe the policy requires.”40  
 
In a subsequent action, the FTC found Rambus liable for, among other things, attempted 
monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and deceptive conduct under Section 
5 of the FTC Act.41  The FTC’s decision, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit, which held that Rambus’s attempt to increase prices following adoption of a standard 
could not amount to anticompetitive conduct unless such conduct also resulted in adoption of the 
standard, which was not shown.42 This decision has been criticized, both on the basis of its antitrust 
analysis and as a matter of public policy, inasmuch as it failed to sanction conduct that was widely 
condemned as deceptive.43 
 
Notably, standards ambush and deception cases have not been limited to the ICT sector.  In 
Momenta v. Amphastar,44 the manufacturer of a generic version of a top-selling anticoagulant was 
accused of failing to disclose its patent covering a quality-control test for the drug that had been 
sanctioned by the Food and Drug Administration, leading to many of the same arguments raised 
in cases such as Rambus and Qualcomm.45 
 
C. SDO Patent Policies  
 
(1) Policy Measures to Address Patent Issues 
 
The Dell and Rambus cases demonstrated to the standards-development community both that 
patent ambush was a real possibility, and that existing SDO policies might lack adequate force to 
prevent such conduct. In response, many SDOs adopted or enhanced their formal policies to 
address ambush issues more clearly. They did so by imposing one or both of the following 
obligations on SDO participants: (1) an obligation to disclose patents essential to implementation 
of a standard, and/or (2) an obligation to license patents essential to implementation of a standard, 
either on a royalty-free basis or on terms that are “reasonable and nondiscriminatory.”46  These 
obligations are intended to ensure that standards developers have sufficient information to assess 
the relative costs and risks of technologies under consideration for standardization. That is, 
disclosure obligations ensure that standards developers know whether and which patents cover 
	
Kenneth M. Vorrasi, Patent Holdup in Standards Development: Life After Rambus v. FTC, Antitrust, Summer 2009, 
at 26. 
40 Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 874 (2003). 
41 Opinion of the Commission, In re Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302, Slip op. at 3 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006) (Public 
Record Version), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/060802commissionopinion.pdf. 
42 Rambus, Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied 129 S.Ct. 1318 (2009). 
43 See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 39, at 683-90; Wilson D. Mudge & Marni B. Karlin, The District of Columbia Circuit 
Court’s Decision in Rambus Overturns the FTC Finding of Monopolization, Intell. Prop. & Tech. L.J. 11, (2008). 
44 Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2018) and Amphastar 
Pharm., Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 222 (D. Mass. 2018). 
45 See Jorge L. Contreras, Is Biopharma Ready For The Standards Wars? 6 Tex. A&M J. Prop. L. (forthcoming, 2020). 
46 See 2007 DOJ/FTC Report, supra note 29, at 42-48; ABA Patent Policy Manual, supra note 39, xiii-xiv. 
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technologies under consideration, giving them the opportunity to “design around” such patents if 
they so wish.47 Likewise, licensing obligations are intended to ensure that such patents will be 
licensed to implementers of the standard on terms that are, at least roughly, understood.48 
 
(2) Royalties for Standards-Essential Patents 
 
Many SDO policies require that participants license patents essential to their standards on terms 
that are “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND) or “fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory” (FRAND).49 This requirement is built into ANSI’s “Essential Requirements” for 
all ANSI-accredited SDOs and is equally pervasive in Europe and other jurisdictions. Despite the 
intuitive appeal of these requirements, however, a consistent and practical definition of FRAND 
terms has failed to emerge.  In several recent cases, parties have disputed whether the terms under 
which licenses have been proffered violate or conform with FRAND requirements.50 
 
FRAND licensing commitments can lead to disputes because there is no universal, objective 
standard by which “reasonableness” (or “nondiscrimination”) can be measured.  In order to make 
a FRAND determination, the specific facts of each situation must be evaluated. These facts include 
not only relevant market norms for royalties, but also customary practices relating to non-royalty 
terms such as reciprocity, grantback licenses, defensive suspension, confidentiality, and the like.  
Also, given that a patent holder’s FRAND licensing terms are generally not revealed until 
negotiations that occur after a standard has been adopted (i.e., “locked-in”), parties involved in 
standards setting can experience uncertainty regarding the ultimate cost of adopting a standard 
encumbered by patents. Put another way, the uncertainty of FRAND licensing may simply 
substitute the risk of patent hold-up arising from unknown patents with hold-up arising from 
unknown FRAND licensing terms.51 
 
A few SDOs have taken steps to clarify the meaning of their FRAND commitments.  In 2006, the 
VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA) amended its patent policy to require that 
participants disclose in advance the “most restrictive” licensing terms in their RAND licenses.52  
Around the same time, the IEEE proposed a similar, but voluntary, arrangement. The U.S. 
Department of Justice indicated that it would not take enforcement action against either SDO, 
explaining that such disclosures would promote, rather than hinder, competition among patent 
holders.53 The European Commission has also expressed a general level of comfort with ex ante 
	
47 ABA Patent Policy Manual, supra note 39, at xiv. 
48 Id. 
49 For purposes of this chapter, we will treat RAND and FRAND requirements as identical. 
50 See generally Chryssoula Pentheroudakis & Justus A. Baron, Licensing Terms of Standard Essential Patents: A 
Comprehensive Analysis of Cases. JRC Science for Policy Report EUR 28302 (2017) (cataloging FRAND litigation 
around the world). 
51 Norman V. Siebrasse, Holdup, Holdout and Royalty Stacking: A Review of the Literature, in Patent Remedies and 
Complex Products: Toward A Global Consensus (C. Bradford Biddle et al. eds., (2019)). 
52 Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Robert A. Skitol on behalf of 
VMEbus International Trade Association (Oct. 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/219380.htm [hereinafter VITA Letter]. 
53 See VITA Letter, supra note 52, and Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, to Michael A. Lindsay on behalf of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (Apr. 30, 2007), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/222978.htm. 
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licensing disclosures in its guidelines relating to horizontal competition.54  In 2015, the IEEE again 
amended its patent policy to clarify various aspects of its FRAND commitment, including the basis 
on which royalties should be charged, imposing a requirement that licenses be made available to 
all applicants, and prohibiting the seeking of injunctive relief from willing licensees.55 These 
amendments were also approved by the Department of Justice,56 although they have been notably 
unpopular with companies that earn substantial revenue from patent royalties.57  
 
 
IV. THE INFORMATICS STANDARDS LANDSCAPE 
 
Informatics research utilizes a broad range of technologies including experimental apparatus such 
as microarrays, data analysis tools, and databases that store and allow sharing of experimental and 
analytic data.  Standards are required within each of these broad technology categories to enable 
data sharing, analysis, and the interoperability of different experimental platforms. To date, 
hundreds of standards relevant to informatics applications have been developed in three broad 
categories: terminological artifacts, reporting requirements, and exchange formats.58  Below is a 
brief description of these categories and a summary of some of the more prominent standardization 
efforts being undertaken in each. 
 
A. Terminological Artifacts   
 
A consistent and unambiguous vocabulary is required in order for different groups and applications 
to communicate about a wide array of organisms, experimental conditions, and study designs.59 A 
“controlled vocabulary” offers a single set of terms with explicitly-defined meanings within a 
particular field.  An “ontology” creates relationships among these terms, often in hierarchical form, 
such as the familiar taxonomic classification for biological entities (kingdom, phylum, class, etc.).   
 
In genomics, the Human Genome Organization supports a Gene Nomenclature, while the Human 
Genomic Variation Society supports a Human Genetic Variant Nomenclature. Similarly, 
SNOMED CT is a global standard of healthcare terms. One of the earliest and most mature 
informatics ontologies is the Gene Ontology (GO), which has produced “a structured, precisely 
defined, common, controlled vocabulary for describing the role of genes and gene products in any 
organism.”60  The Gene Ontology Consortium, which developed the GO, began its work in 1998 
	
54 European Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, ¶299 (2011). 
55 IEEE Standards Board Bylaws § 6 (2015). 
56 Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to Michael A. Lindsay, Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Feb. 
2, 2015). 
57 See Jorge L. Contreras, Taking it to the Limit: Shifting U.S. Antitrust Policy Toward Standards Development, 103 
Minn. L. Rev. Headnotes 66, 73-75 (Fall 2018). 
58 This classification system was developed by Biosharing.org, which catalogs and provides information regarding 
most of the standards discussed below. See A Catalogue of Standards, biosharing, 
http://www.biosharing.org/standards (last visited October 28, 2011).  A list of the standards compiled by 
biosharing.org can be found at http://www.biosharing.org/standards_view.  
59 Thomas R. Gruber, Toward Principles for the Design of Ontologies Used for Knowledge Sharing?, 43 Int’l Journal 
of Human-Computer Studies 907, 908 (1995). 
60 See Michael Ashburner et al., Gene Ontology: Tool for the Unification of Biology, 25 Nature Genetics 25 (2000). 
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as a joint project of research groups studying three different organisms (the fruit fly, budding yeast, 
and mouse).  As of 2020, the GO included more than 1.4 million annotated gene products.61 
 
Numerous other ontology projects have arisen following the success of the GO.62  These include 
the Systems Biology Ontology (SBO) originated by EBI,63 the Open Biological and Biomedical 
Ontologies (OBO Foundry),64 and FuGO project.65 
 
B. Reporting Requirements   
 
The advent of microarray technology in the 1990s quickly led to the realization by the research 
community that standardized methods of reporting experimental data generated by microarray 
studies would be required.  The Microarray Gene Expression Data (MGED) Society (now the 
Functional Genomics Data Society) was formed in 1999 by EBI to develop “Minimum Information 
About A Microarray Experiment” (MIAME), a checklist specifying the information about every 
microarray experiment that should be reported in order to enable its proper validation, 
reproduction, and interpretation.66 
 
Many other minimum information standards development efforts have followed the early success 
of MIAME. 67  Among others, these include specifications for minimum information in 
hybridization and immunohistochemistry experiments (MISFISHIE),68 proteomics experiments 
(MIAPE),69 molecular interactions (MIMIx),70 and (meta)genome sequences (MIGS/MIMS).71  
The Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations (MIBBI) Project collects 
and publishes information about various minimum information standards.72 The Adaptive Immune 
Receptor Repertoire (AIRR) Community has developed a Minimal information about Adaptive 
	
61 See Gene Ontology Consortium, The Gene Ontology (GO) Project in 2006, 34 Nucleic Acid Research D322, D323 
(2006); Gene Ontology Resource, Statistics, http://geneontology.org/stats.html (last visited May 21, 2020). 
62 A more comprehensive list of ontology projects can be found in Chris F. Taylor, Standards for Reporting Bioscience 
Data: A Forward Look, 12 Drug Discovery Today 527, 529 (2007). 
63  See Systems Biology Ontology, European Molecular Biology Lab.-European Bioinformatics Inst., 
http://www.ebi.ac.uk/sbo/main (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). 
64 See Barry Smith, The OBO Foundry: Coordinated Evolution of Ontologies to Support Biomedical Data Integration, 
25 Nature Biotechnology 1251 (2007). 
65 See Patricia L. Whetzel et al., Development of FuGO: An Ontology for Functional Genomics Investigations, 10 
OMICS 199 (2006). 
66 See Catherine A. Ball & Alvis Brazma, MGED Standards: Work in Progress, 10 OMICS 138, 139-140 (2006). 
67 There are more comprehensive lists of minimum information standards projects available: Taylor, supra note 62, at 
528; Lyle D. Burgoon, Clearing the Standards Landscape: the Semantics of Terminology and their Impact on 
Toxicologenomics, 99 Toxicological Sciences 403, 408-10 (2007). 
68 See Inst. for Sys. Biology, MISFISHIE, http://scgap.systemsbiology.net/standards/misfishie/ (last visited Oct. 28, 
2011). 
69 See Sandra Orchard & Henning Hermjakob, The HUPO Proteomics Standards Initiative – Easing Communication 
and Minimizing Data Loss in a Changing World, 9 Briefings in Bioinformatics 166, 167 (2008). 
70 See id. at 170-71. 
71 See Pelin Yilmaz, The Genomic Standards Consortium: Bringing Standards to Life for Microbial Ecology, 5 ISME 
J. 1565 (2011). 
72  See Chris F. Taylor, Promoting Coherent Minimum Reporting Guidelines for Biological and Biomedical 
Investigations: the MIBBI Project, 26 Nature Biotechnology 889, 889 (2008). 
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Immune Receptor Repertoire datasets (MiAIRR).73 In the field of neuroscience, the Brain Imaging 
Data Structure (BIDS) supports the reporting of data from neuroimaging experiments. 
 
C. Exchange Formats   
 
A recent compilation of molecular biology databases lists 1330 different data sources across the 
world.74 In order for researchers to make use of data beyond their own laboratories, they require 
the ability to access and utilize data from disparate sources.  The exchange of data among different 
software applications and databases has become commonplace in today’s data-driven economy.  
Much of this exchange is accomplished using markup languages, or schema that enable the 
annotation of digital text in a manner that can be interpreted by a computer.75  The most common 
markup language, Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), is the dominant language for encoding 
web pages.76  Markup languages work through the use of “tags” that delimit characteristics of the 
text they designate.  For example, in HTML, the tags <B> and </B> cause the text between the 
tags to be displayed in boldface type.  Extensible Markup Language (XML), developed by the 
Worldwide Web Consortium (W3C), is a flexible data format that enables users to create 
customized tags based on the specific types of data in which they are interested.77  Hundreds of 
XML-based languages exist today, many of which are optimized for informatics applications.78 
Among the best-known XML-based bio-focused languages are the Systems Biology Markup 
Language (SBML),79 CellML for computational cell biology,80 MAGE-ML, for the exchange of 
microarray data, 81 and BioPAX, for the exchange of biological pathway data.82 
 
Despite the widespread adoption of XML as the preferred standard for data exchange in the 
biosciences, some commentators have criticized XML as too limited and imprecise for the robust 
exchange of scientific data.83  An alternative data exchange standard is the Reference Data Format 
(RDF), also developed by W3C, which takes advantage of the so-called “semantic web” and offers 
developers greater freedom to define data relationships.84  The Bio2RDF Project led by W3C has 
	
73 Jacob S. Sherkow, [AIRR working paper] 
74 Michael Y. Galperin & Guy R. Cochrane, The 2011 Nucleic Acids Research Database Issue and the Online 
Molecular Biology Database Collection, 39 Nucleic Acids Res. D1, D1 (2011). 
75 James H. Coombs et al., Markup Systems and the Future of Scholarly Text Processing, 30 Comm. ACM 933 (1987). 
76 Introduction to HTML 4, W3C, http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/intro/intro.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
77 Extensible Markup Language Introduction, W3C, http://www.w3.org/XML/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
78 More comprehensive lists of bioinformatics markup languages can be found in Burgoon, supra note 67, at 409; 
Luciano Milanesi, Trends in Modeling Biomedical Complex Systems, 10 BMC Bioinformatics, 12 (Supp. 2009). 
79 See M. Hucka, The Systems Biology Markup Language (SBML): A Medium for Representation and Exchange of 
Biochemical Network Models, 19 Bioinformatics 524 (2003).  
80 See Catherine M. Lloyd et al., CellML: Its Future, Present and Past, 85 Progress in Biophysics & Molecular Biology 
433, 436 (2004). 
81 See Ball & Brazma, supra note 66, at 140-41. 
82  See Christoph Wierling et al., Resources, Standards and Tools for Systems Biology, 6 Briefings Functional 
Genomics & Proteomics 240, 245-46 (2007). 
83 See, e.g., John Quackenbush, Standardizing the Standards, 2 Molecular Systems Biology 1, 1-2 (2006); Xiaoshu 
Wang et al., From XML to RDF: how semantic web technologies will change the design of ‘omic’ standards, 23 Nature 
Biotechnology 1099 (2005). 
84  Wang et al., supra note 83, at 1099. 
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recently developed software and a website for accessing data from different public informatics 
databases in RDF format.85 
 
Closely related to markup languages are object models. Object models describe the relationships 
among computer programming “objects” of interest within a given discipline and can thus act as 
blueprints for the development of specialized markup languages. 86   Of particular interest in 
informatics are the Microarray and Gene Expression Object Model (MAGE-OM),87 the SysBio-
OM developed by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS),88 and the 
Functional Genomics Experiment Object Model (FuGE-OM).89 
 
The object models and markup languages discussed above are essential for the exchange of data 
among disparate data sources and databases.  Yet data exchange tools alone are not enough, and 
commentators find that the proliferation of incompatible data sources has led to increasing 
duplication of effort, poor interoperability, and loss of data.90  To address these problems, an 
international consortium of database users and developers has begun work on a uniform set of 
defining attributes for biological databases called BioDBCore.91 
 
Technology is allowing more sophisticated and granular exchange of bioinformatics data. 
Increasingly, data exchange standards are coupled with associated application programming 
interfaces (APIs), which enable access to targeted components of a database or a data file. The 
GA4GH Beacon API standard, for example, allows for researchers to query a whole genome 
sequence or database of sequences to ask if it contains a particular variant of interest.92 This can 
allow researchers to find genomes of interest without having to first request access to or download 




As the bioinformatics field matures, the range of related standards continues to diversify. The 
Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH) and the Moving Picture Experts Group 
(MPEG), a working group of ISO (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 29/WG 11) have both released compression 
standards for genomic data, respectively CRAM and MPEG_G. The GA4GH has also developed 
	
85 See Francois Bellau et al., Bio2RDF: Towards a Mashup to Build Bioinformatics Knowledge Systems, 41 J. 
Biomedical Informatics 706 (2008). 
86 Philippe LeHegaret et al., What is Document Object Model?, W3C, Apr. 7, 2004,  http://www.w3.org/TR/DOM-
Level-3-Core/introduction.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). 
87  Microarrary Gene Experiment – Object Model, Functional Genomics Data Society, 
http://www.mged.org/Workgroups/MAGE/mage.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). 
88  Burgoon, supra note 67, at 409. 
89  Functional Genomics Experiment Object Model, Functional Genomics Experiment, 
http://fuge.sourceforge.net/index.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).  
90 See Pascale Gaudet, et al., Towards BioDBCore: A Community-Defined Information Specification for Biological 
Databases, 39 Nucleic Acids Res. D7 (2011). 
91 Id. 
92 Global Alliance for Genomics and Health, Beacon Project, https://beacon-project.io/ (last visited May 21, 2020). 
The API accepts “queries in the form “Do you have any genomes with an ‘A’ at position 100735 on chromosome 3” 
and responds with “Yes” or “No.” ” 
93 Parth Sagdeo, Application Programming Interfaces and the Standardization-Value Appropriation Problem, 32 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology (2018), p 241-43. 
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an encryption standard for genomic data, CRYPT4GH. These areas appear to be more susceptible 
to patenting, raising patent considerations for SDOs.94 
 
 
V. INFORMATICS STANDARDS POLICIES TODAY: ASSESSMENT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. Summary of Informatics SDO Policies 
 
Technical standards are likely to play an increasingly prominent role in the development, adoption, 
and regulation of informatics research and technologies.  Whether such standards relate to 
minimum information requirements, controlled vocabularies, or data exchange formats, the legal 
and policy considerations described in this section will play a key role in determining which of 
these standards are broadly adopted, and at what price.95 
 
Given the importance of legal issues to standards development in other sectors of the economy, 
we conducted a review of the publicly-available policies and rules of a number of major 
informatics standards initiatives.  The results, summarized in Appendix 1 below, indicate that few 
standardization efforts in informatics address these issues in detail, and a significant number omit 
any legal guidelines in their public documentation. In many cases the organizations responsible 
for bioinformatics standards development either lack written policies entirely or have adopted 
vague, aspirational statements regarding a desire that materials produced be “open” and publicly-
available. This informality generally reflects the academic and open science context of most 
bioinformatics standards development and implementation. Furthermore, some bioinformatics 
SDOs focus on specific standard types with limited IP implications (e.g., terminologies). This 
informal and minimalist approach to IP may become increasingly problematic with greater 
commercial and healthcare involvement in bioinformatics standardization. It not only invites 
opportunistic behavior, but also leaves aggrieved participants with little legal recourse after abuse 
has occurred.   
 
Nevertheless, the data collected in Appendix 1 does reveal a number of recurring themes. These 
include a general preference that informatics standards be “open” and “not restricted” by 
intellectual property rights.  Stated more precisely, these preferences can be expressed in terms of 
the following two maxims: (a) informatics standards should be freely available, and (b) the 
implementation of informatics standards should not be impeded by patents. 
 
By contrast, health informatics standards development envisaging implementation in healthcare 
contexts is characterized by formal intellectual property policies (see Table 1). Healthcare 
terminologies like SNOMED, CT and LOINC are protected by copyright and trademark. Health 
	
94 	See e.g., Sterling Thomas, Nate Dellinger & Mychal Ivancich, Compression and transmission of genomic 
information (2016), https://patents.google.com/patent/US20160344849/en?oq=genomic+compression (last visited 
May 21, 2020).	
95 Admittedly, intellectual property considerations may play a smaller role in standards devoted to the definition of 
controlled vocabularies and minimum information guidelines (which are themselves less amenable to patent 
protection) than they do in standards relating to data exchange formats, database structures, and scientific apparatus. 
This distinction may be less pronounced with respect to the impact and importance of antitrust issues. 
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informatics SDOs also have a more diverse range of business models, with some making standards 
freely available, and others using IP to protect standards made available only through member 
licenses. As bioinformatics matures, bioinformatics and associated standards will increasingly also 
need to be implemented in clinical research and healthcare contexts. 96  Traditional health 
informatics SDOs will play a greater lead or partnership role with respect to clinical 
bioinformatics. An example of a bioinformatics standard with a clinical focus is ISO/TS 
20428:2017, which describes data and metadata structures for clinical genomic sequence 
information in electronic health records. These bioinformatics standards will need to be coupled 
with greater clarity around IP rights. 
 
B. Policy Recommendations 
 
As discussed above, it is important for SDOs to establish clear policies regarding compliance with 
antitrust law and the disposition of intellectual property rights in a manner that is aligned with the 
expectations and wishes of their participants. This is especially true for generalist SDOs adopting 
an open-ended range of standard types. At a minimum, such policies should include provisions 
addressing the antitrust considerations described in Section IV.E above, as well minimum 
provisions relating to copyrights and patents. Among the more critical issues to include in such 




● What rights do SDO participants grant to the SDO and to one another with 
respect to their copyrights in documents (e.g., specifications), text and 
code that are “contributed” to a standard? 
● Is the standard available free of charge, or must those wishing to 
implement it purchase copies from the SDO or others?  If the latter, do 
SDO participants gain access at a discounted rate? 
● What rights does the SDO grant to the world under its copyrights, if any, 
in a standard (e.g., can the standard be reproduced, modified, translated, 
excerpted, re-distributed, or otherwise manipulated outside of the SDO 




● May SDO participants obtain patents covering the implementation of the 
SDO’s standards? 
● If so, must these participants commit to license such patents to all 
implementers of the standards? 
● If so, must these licenses be royalty-free, or may royalties be charged 
(and if so, are there any limitations on royalty-rates, FRAND or 
otherwise)? 
● Must participants disclose these patents and, if so, when? 
 
	
96 Ewan Birney, The convergence of research and clinical genomics, 104 American Journal of Human Genetics 781–
783 (2019). 
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While at first blush it might appear that the above issues can be addressed in a relatively 
straightforward and concise manner, SDO antitrust and intellectual property policies have become 
increasingly complex and lengthy over the years. This trend can generally be attributed to the 
desire of SDO participants, and their legal counsel, to anticipate a growing range of legal 
contingencies and to accommodate the diverse interests and business models of those participants. 
For example, in a typical SDO that focuses on the development of next-generation wireless 
telephony standards, participants might include handset manufacturers, chip designers, service 
providers (carriers), software developers, and businesses that do no more than acquire and assert 
patents, not to mention academics, consumer advocates, and government agencies.  It is not 
surprising that developing a policy that accommodates the requirements of each of these groups 
can be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive and can result in a complex policy that reflects 
myriad compromises required to appease these differing interests and business models. 
 
In contrast to the world of mobile telephony, participants in informatics standards development 
activities currently appear to consist primarily of academics, industrial scientists, and a handful of 
product vendors. This observation, coupled with the general consensus around the simple 
intellectual property-related maxims described in Section VI.A above, suggests that informatics 
SDOs might be able to adopt legally-prudent policies while avoiding the complexity, effort, and 
rancor often experienced in ICT-focused SDOs.   
 
To this end, Appendix 2 contains a brief example of an SDO policy reflecting the two maxims 
noted above and other key provisions. While it is not intended that this exemplar be adopted 
verbatim by all SDOs, it is hoped that it might be useful as a starting point for consideration, and 
that it might provide scaffolding atop which an SDO may build more specialized provisions to 
address the particularized needs of its participants.97 Additional examples can be found on the 
websites of the SDOs listed in Appendix 1. 
 
C. Making Policies Binding 
 
Even the most artfully-drafted SDO policy is of little value unless it binds its participants and 
possibly other implementers and users of its standards. Simply announcing the SDO’s policy on 
the SDO website, without affirmative assent by those parties that the SDO intends to bind, will 
make the policy more difficult to enforce.98  Thus, SDOs have adopted a variety of approaches to 
ensure (or at least improve the chances) that their policies will legally bind their participants.  
These approaches include the incorporation of such policies into the SDO’s by-laws and other 
constitutional documents, the use of signed participation agreements, and the issuance of frequent 
reminders of the existence and effect of such policies.99 
 
	
97 The ABA Patent Policy Manual, supra note 39, contains a large collection of annotated sample clauses that appear 
in SDO patent policies.  The exemplar presented in Appendix 1 is intentionally brief and does not delve into most of 
the complexities addressed by the Manual.  For example, the exemplar policy does not address issues associated with 
the inclusion of software code in a standard, nor the licensing of patents on royalty-bearing terms. 
98 See Jorge L. Contreras, Enforcing FRAND and Other SDO Licensing Commitments in Cambridge Handbook of 
Technical Standardization Law: Competition, Antitrust, and Patents 178 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). 
99 See ABA Standards Manual, supra note 39, at 27. 
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Many informatics standardization efforts are carried out in semi-academic settings without formal 
participation or membership structures. Groups of this nature would do well to consider 
formalizing their participation at least to the extent of requiring that participants expressly 




Though informatics SDOs have demonstrated a consistent preference for standards that are open 
and unencumbered by intellectual property rights, few of them have adopted explicit policies 
ensuring that these preferences will be respected by their participants. As evidenced by the 
increasing number of disputes and litigation in other fields that are heavily dependent on 
interoperability standards, it is important for organizations to adopt clear and binding policies 
governing the conduct of their participants. Accordingly, informatics SDOs should carefully 
review their existing policies and procedures. To the extent that they fail to address key points 
regarding process and intellectual property, these policies and procedures should be revised to 
reflect the intentions and expectations of participants in the standardization process. 
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100 Work on CellML began in 2004. The University itself is much older. 
101	This	committee	was	started	within	the	National	Electrical	Manufacturers	Association,	founded	in	
1926.	
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Sample Informatics “Open” Standards Development Policy 
 
[Insert name of standards development organization] (SDO) is committed to the open and 
transparent development and dissemination of technical standards relating to [subject matter]. 
Accordingly, all physical and online meetings, working groups, mailing lists, correspondence, and 
other activities conducted under the auspices of SDO (“SDO Activities”) will be subject to the 
following rules. 
 
1. Anticompetitive Conduct. 
 
No SDO Participant102 shall, during or in connection with any SDO Activity: 
 
a. discuss product prices, profits, internal cost, bidding, terms of bidding, allocation of customers, 
division of sales markets, sales territories, or marketing strategies; 
 
b. condition or discuss conditioning the implementation of an SDO standard on the implementer’s 
use of products or services offered by a particular party; or 
 




a. Each SDO Participant hereby grants to SDO and each other SDO Participant a non-exclusive, 
perpetual, royalty-free copyright license to reproduce, modify, distribute, and create derivative 
works of every document, proposal, text, code, comment, or other written item submitted by such 
SDO Participant to SDO or other SDO Participants in connection with any SDO Activity that is 
intended to influence or be incorporated into any draft or final standard (a “Contribution”).  
SDO Participants otherwise retain all rights in their respective Contributions. 
 
b. Each SDO Participant agrees that the copyright in any final standard published by SDO shall be 
owned by SDO, subject to SDO Participants’ retention of ownership of copyright in their 
individual Contributions. 
 
c. SDO grants to each person wishing a license (a “User”), solely to the extent of SDO’s legal right 
to do so, a perpetual, non-exclusive, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, worldwide licence to copy, 
distribute, and create derivative works of each SDO standard, under all copyrights and related 
rights therein (including moral rights and rights of authors), for any purpose. 
 
d.  Each User agrees to include in every reproduction, in whole or in substantial part, of any SDO 
standard the following notifications: (1) the text “Created by SDO” and (2) any copyright notice 
that is included in the SDO standard and (3) the text “Use and reproduction of this document is 
	
102 The term “SDO Participant” should be defined to include all members, organizers, promoters, and other participants 
in SDO Activities, together with their corporate affiliates. 
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subject to the terms of the SDO Open Standards Development Policy, a current version of which 
may be found at http://______________”. Such text shall be included in one or more prominent 





a. Each SDO Participant agrees that it shall not, at any time during or after its participation in SDO, 
assert or seek to collect royalties on any patent that is commercially necessary to implement an 
SDO standard (“Necessary Patent”) against any product or process that implements that SDO 
standard.  
 
b.  As soon as possible after an SDO Participant becomes aware that it owns or controls a patent 
or patent application that is likely to be a Necessary Patent, such SDO Participant shall disclose 
such patent or patent application, including its specification and claim language, to SDO.  SDO 
shall post all such disclosures on its public web site.  
 
c.  SDO Participant agrees and acknowledges that other SDO participants working within SDO 
may, individually or collectively, seek to modify draft SDO standards so as to avoid one or more 
Necessary Patents, and such activity does not, without more, constitute a violation of any antitrust 
or competition law. 
 
 
4. No Confidential Information. 
 
No Contribution submitted by any SDO Participant shall be deemed to be proprietary or 
confidential, and neither SDO nor any SDO Participant shall have any obligation to maintain any 
Contribution as confidential. 
 
5.  Transfers. 
 
Each SDO Participant shall ensure that if, during or after its participation in SDO, it sells, assigns, 
transfers or otherwise conveys an enforceable interest in or to any Contribution or Necessary 
Patent to any third party, such SDO Participant’s obligations under this Policy (including its 
obligations under this Paragraph 5) shall bind such third party, and the SDO Participant shall notify 
any actual or proposed third party transferee in writing of all such obligations. 
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